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Packaging Inspiration: Al Qaeda’s Digital Magazine  
Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process 
 
SUSAN CURRIE SIVEK 
Linfield College 
 
 
Al Qaeda is today a fragmented organization, and its strategic communication efforts 
now focus largely on recruiting individuals in the West to carry out “individual jihad” in 
their home countries. One Al Qaeda–affiliated publication, Inspire, represents an unusual 
use of the digital magazine format and content for recruitment. This study examines the 
content and design of Inspire to determine how the magazine may advance the self-
radicalization that it seeks to induce in its readers. This analysis finds that the magazine 
weaves together jihadist ideology, a narrow interpretation of Islam, and appropriations 
of Western popular culture to maximize the publication’s potential for motivating readers 
toward violence. 
 
Keywords: Al Qaeda, terrorism, self-radicalization, digital magazine, counterterrorism 
 
 
A 19-year-old London perfume salesman was jailed in May 2012 for having four digital copies of a 
magazine (Hodges, 2012). Four more men in England, all originally from Pakistan, were charged in April 
2012 with terrorism-related crimes for plotting an attack. All possessed copies of the same magazine 
(Greenwood, 2012). The United Kingdom deported two German nationals in March 2012 after their 
conviction for possessing this digital magazine on a hard drive (Slack, 2012). 
 
In the United States, Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo, age 22, faces life in prison if convicted of 
“attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.” Abdo was arrested in July 2011 for possessing bomb-
making materials with which he allegedly plotted to attack Fort Hood in Texas. When police searched his 
hotel room, they found bomb-making directions from this same digital magazine. At a court appearance, 
Abdo shouted, “Nidal Hasan, Fort Hood, 2009.” His shout referred to the army officer who attacked 
soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009, killing 13 and wounding 38, and who this magazine mentions as a model for 
aspiring jihadis (Brown, 2012). 
 
 What is the magazine that may have motivated these men—and possibly others, even at this 
moment—to plot terror attacks? It is Inspire, a digital publication created by members of Al Qaeda in the 
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Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and distributed online for anyone to download and read. Designed to radicalize 
marginalized Muslims in the West and motivate them to initiate independent terror attacks, Inspire’s 
message has resonated with at least a few readers. And only a few inspired readers would be needed to 
cause significant destruction and loss of life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The cover of the Fall 2010 issue of Inspire. 
 
Inspire is a fascinating representation of multiple phenomena: the fragmentation in Al Qaeda’s 
structure and message, the magazine medium’s ability to form communities around specific interests and 
promote opportunities for self-actualization, and the strategic use of digital media to encourage self-
radicalization among audiences intrigued by such ideology. (See Figure 1.) This study examines how 
Inspire’s construction capitalizes upon the coincidence of these factors. This article examines Inspire’s 
physical design in the style of a mainstream Western magazine as well as the ideology and narratives it 
uses to guide readers through the processes of self-radicalization—which appears to have occurred with 
the individuals above.   
                                                    
Al Qaeda Today and Its Communication Strategies 
 
Documents obtained during the May 2011 assassination strike on Osama bin Laden revealed the 
extent to which Al Qaeda had deteriorated as a unified group. In a review of bin Laden’s correspondence, 
analysts at the Combating Terrorism Center (Rassler, Koehler-Derrick, Collins, al-Obaidi, & Lahoud, 2012) 
describe his frustration with Al Qaeda’s fragmentation into multiple regional groups and with his inability 
to control their activities and messages. Bin Laden felt these groups lacked competence in crafting 
communication and operational strategies. Bin Laden preferred complex operations, not attacks by solitary 
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individuals, and thought Inspire’s promotion of haphazard independent operations would have “dangerous 
consequences” for the jihadi cause (Rassler et al., 2012, p. 52).  
 
Counterterrorism experts are concerned about the growth of smaller, harder-to-detect terror 
groups and by Al Qaeda’s effort to recruit independent individuals in the West to carry out “lone wolf” 
missions in their home countries (Springer, Regens, & Edger, 2009). Lone wolves have many motivations 
for terrorism and can access a wide variety of encouraging online materials. For recruitment, Al Qaeda 
deploys strategic messages. Corman and Schiefelbein (2008) describe three primary goals of Al Qaeda’s 
overarching communication strategy, inasmuch as it remains coherent: (1) legitimating its own views and 
actions to gain social and religious acceptance among Muslims; (2) recruiting new followers; and (3) 
intimidating opponents, whether Muslims who disagree with the jihadi cause or Westerners the 
organization seeks to frighten. Al Qaeda uses many digital tools in this strategy, including e-mail lists, 
blogs, forums, chat rooms, games, social media groups, magazines, and videos for flexible, global 
distribution, with little real threat of censorship. Although these formats permit infinite reproduction of Al 
Qaeda communications, they also fragment its messaging and open those messages to users’ critique 
(e.g., in comments on YouTube videos; Torres Soriano, 2012). 
 
Al Qaeda’s Digital Magazines 
 
Among these formats, the magazine medium can help Al Qaeda refocus an increasingly 
fragmented message and motivate those interested in its ideology and mission. As documented by Seib 
and Janbek (2011), Al Qaeda used digital magazines prior to Inspire to spread its ideology and 
recruitment messages, with many published in Arabic, but some in English and designed for Westerners. 
For example, in 2009, the Al Mosul Islamic Network published a digital magazine called Defenders of the 
Truth that Iraqi insurgents hoped would activate American Muslims during the Iraq War (Seib & Janbek, 
2011, p. 34). The closest comparison to Inspire, however, was an earlier English-language magazine 
called Jihad Recollections, also published by Samir Khan of Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula. (See Figure 2.)  
 
Jihad Recollections also promoted terrorist activity, but was perhaps less appealing to potential 
recruits—and, crucially, less intriguing to Western media. Although both Jihad Recollections and Inspire 
display relatively sophisticated design and content, Inspire represents a distinct approach; its subtleties 
are discussed below, but key differences are noted here to establish Inspire’s uniqueness. First, Jihad 
Recollections and Inspire both appeal to Muslims in the West, but Inspire especially focuses on 
Westerners’ anti-Islamic activity. This emphasis may invoke readers’ concern about “a future of religious 
intolerance for Muslims in the United States” (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011, para. 4). Second, Inspire 
appeals to Western youth and celebrity culture, often focusing on AQAP leader Anwar Al Awlaki, whom 
readers may wish to emulate due to his “celebrity sheikh” and “Al Qaeda Idol” status, described by 
Brachman and Levine (2011). Finally, the often humorous and satirical tone of Inspire differs from that of 
Jihad Recollections. While Inspire contains heavy ideological and religious texts, it includes lighter items 
(inasmuch as possible in a terrorist publication) that appeal to a youthful audience. Perhaps more 
importantly, those lighter items drew Western media attention as Jihad Recollections never could. Inspire 
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articles with eye-catching titles like “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” and “The Ultimate Mowing 
Machine” were perfectly suited for sensationalized Western media coverage of Inspire.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. One of Samir Khan’s articles in Inspire. 
 
 
Inspire attracted more attention from mainstream Western media than Jihad Recollections. 
LexisNexis searches for coverage of Jihad Recollections and Inspire reveal dramatic differences: The 
former was mentioned 93 times in all news sources, while the latter appeared more than 4,000 times. 1 
Concomitant with this coverage, a Google Trends search shows that, aside from one small spike in 
searches for Jihad Recollections in the second quarter of 2009, its search traffic is dwarfed by that 
generated by searches for Inspire. Inspire magazine has consistently been a far more active search term 
since its first issue in summer 2010 (Google Trends, 2012). And, although a full analysis of coverage of 
Inspire is beyond the scope of this study, it appears that much American coverage of Inspire, particularly 
online news and blog reports, is derogatory. While journalists certainly would not endorse the publication, 
much of the coverage does not take Inspire’s message or goals seriously and insults its creators and 
readers, calling them “weaksauce wannabes” (Ackerman, 2011), “sour grapes,” and “jerks” (Linkins, 
2011). Western journalists’ frequent, negative portrayal of the magazine might have intensified Inspire 
                                               
1 This analysis, conducted in September 2012, included the LexisNexis categories of “Major World 
Publications,” “All News (English),” and “Broadcast Transcripts” for all time periods available. The search 
for Inspire in “All News (English)” returned more than 3,000 news records; beyond that number, 
LexisNexis will not provide a precise quantity of results. The “Major World Publications” and “Broadcast 
Transcripts” categories contained 745 and 1,051 results, respectively, that mentioned Inspire. 
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readers’ desire to seek it out, amplified their preexisting doubts about Western attitudes toward Islam, 
and augmented their reactions to representations of Islamophobia within the magazine. As a whole, 
Inspire appears to possess a greater capacity for reaching and affecting readers than previous Al Qaeda 
English-language publications. 
 
Although a September 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen killed Samir Khan and Anwar Al Awlaki, 
Inspire clearly benefited from their media experience, technological sophistication (particularly Khan’s 
graphic design knowledge), and extensive experience living in the West. Their facility with English and 
deep understanding of Western popular culture lent Inspire significance and resonance that surpassed that 
of previous publications, as explored below. Moreover, though a new publisher now manages Inspire and 
lacks his predecessor’s English fluency, precedents set by Khan and Al Awlaki persist. The new editor 
proudly declares in the Winter 2012 issue that he is “still publishing America’s worst nightmare.” One year 
after the drone strike, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center told the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs that  
 
AQAP remains intent on publishing the English-language Inspire magazine . . . in order 
to mobilize Western-based individuals for violent action. While the deaths of al-Aulaqi 
and Khan have affected the quality of the magazine, the publication endures and 
continues to reach a wide global audience of extremists. (Homeland Threat Landscape, 
2012) 
 
As this testimony suggests, spelling and grammatical errors likely won’t deter Inspire’s audience from 
considering its messages. 
 
The Power of the Magazine Medium 
 
Given Al Qaeda’s need to provide potential recruits with a coherent message, motivation, and 
course of action, the magazine medium offers an effective way to present a coherent set of ideas through 
its editorial voice and community-building capability. Insights from magazine research suggest that these 
are strengths of the magazine medium. Magazine researchers emphasize magazines’ ability to unify 
audiences through the construction of communities around topics and through the medium’s distinctive 
mode of address. Abrahamson (2007) calls this phenomenon “magazine exceptionalism.” Abrahamson 
attributes this ability to the lack of journalistic distance among editors, authors, and readers due to their 
shared personal interest in a publication’s topic. Researchers have analyzed how communities as diverse 
as “netizens” (Frau-Meigs, 2000), gay consumers (Sender, 2001), and generational identities (Kitch, 
2003) have been constructed in part through magazine content designed to define and motivate them. In 
Inspire, numerous first-person pieces, including some by Al Awlaki and Khan themselves (e.g., Al Awlaki’s 
“Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” series), demonstrate these shared interests. Furthermore, magazines direct 
their readers to specific ways to participate in the shared community (as does Inspire). A digital magazine 
like Inspire might not have the same capability to unify and activate a community of readers that a print 
magazine may possess. Circulating a print Al Qaeda magazine would be impossible. But the content and 
format of the magazine could still create a sense of connection to the jihadi cause among readers 
motivated to seek out the digital magazine.  
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Magazines also draw readers into their content and often encourage lifestyle changes. Specialized 
magazines encourage readers to identify with the images presented, offering what Breazeale (1994) calls 
“calculated packages of meaning whose aim is to transform the reader into an imaginary subject” (p. 9). 
Machin and van Leeuwen (2005) note the frequent use of second-person address in magazine content: 
The editorial persona calls the reader “you.” This direct address implies that the reader should act upon 
the magazine’s messages, often through lifestyle changes, as part of self-actualization. Whether and how 
readers act upon this encouragement is not fully understood, but there is evidence that magazine content 
does affect readers. Much of this research has focused on Western women’s body image and magazine 
exposure (e.g., Arciszewski, Berjot, & Finez, 2012) and reveals that magazine content can indeed shape 
audience attitudes in significant, life-changing ways. In addition, studies within the magazine industry 
have found that magazine content and advertising can motivate purchasing decisions and online 
information seeking (Association of Magazine Media, 2012). As explored below, the Western magazine 
model adopted by Inspire might similarly alter attitudes among already intrigued readers accustomed to 
internalizing messages presented in this communicative style. 
 
Finally, constructing a coherent package of ideas in the form of Inspire, within which greater 
editorial control and even brand identity can be asserted, could help AQAP better communicate its goals to 
potential lone wolf recruits. Whereas other online media permit user feedback and remixing, a magazine, 
even in digital form, is a unitary, stable package of content that is harder to alter. The digital magazine 
medium offers advantages for communicating a consistent, motivating message to AQAP’s target 
audience. 
 
Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process 
 
Inspire’s target audience, its content makes clear, is prospective lone wolf terrorists, particularly 
Muslims in the West who feel marginalized in their countries of origin or current residence. This individual 
might fit the “Loner” description in Pantucci’s typology (2011) of lone wolf terrorists:  
 
an individual who plans or attempts to carry out an act of terrorism using the cover of 
extreme Islamist ideology . . . [without] any actual connection or contact with 
extremists—beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption on the 
Internet or from society at large. (p. 14) 
 
For Loners, the ideologies and activities proposed by online jihadist literature may seem a valid 
way to rectify other personal issues or perceived social and political injustices. With its keen sense of 
Western culture and emphasis on Western Islamophobia, Inspire may be an especially alluring medium for 
motivation. 
 
In general, the Internet’s role in self-radicalization is becoming clearer. Europol (2010) has noted 
terrorist organizations’ growing Internet recruitment, especially among youth. Increasingly, this outreach 
occurs in Western languages (Europol, 2010). Homegrown terrorists proliferate in the United States. Of 
202 people in the United States charged with “serious jihadist crimes” since September 11, 131 were U.S. 
citizens, representing diverse terrorist training and Islamic ideological perspectives (Greenberg, 2010). 
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Musa and Bendett (2010) trace an increase in terrorist plots by individuals who were inspired by media, 
sought out like-minded individuals online, did not participate in a face-to-face Muslim community, and 
lacked a strong interpersonal connection to a terrorist network. In these cases—as with Pantucci’s 
Loners—Internet media were the primary or sole link to jihadi ideology and information.  
 
To explain these individuals’ development into prospective terrorists, Helfstein (2012) offers a 
useful model of the self-radicalization process with four stages: awareness, interest, acceptance, and 
implementation. In Helfstein’s model, awareness is a long-term process that occurs over time as an 
individual’s knowledge of radical ideology and tactics deepens. Interest in this model consists of more than 
curiosity; it also includes “the willingness to alter one’s belief system or social norms to reflect those 
associated with an ideological doctrine” (Helfstein, 2012, p. 16). When potential lone wolves become 
“interested” in jihad under this model, they also integrate jihadist ideas into their own thinking. 
Acceptance is the final assimilation of radical ideas and norms into the recruit’s thought processes. 
Recruits to violent causes must accept the necessity of violence to achieve sociopolitical goals and enact 
radical ideology. Only then can the newly radicalized individual follow through on the implementation of a 
violent act. 
 
Helfstein states that current evidence shows that self-radicalization is not a linear process but 
rather an “iterative” development within the individual that may contain feedback loops. Moreover, this 
long-term process can be either interrupted or reinforced by outside forces, including by the individual 
himself or herself. Some people become aware and interested but don’t complete the acceptance process 
“without greater exposure to new information and social relationships”; furthermore, “interested parties” 
may intervene to support or discourage radicalization (Helfstein, 2012, p. 17). Some segments of the 
process are also easier to complete. Helfstein argues that developing awareness is relatively simple, but 
gaining the deeper interest described above is more challenging. The movement from interest to 
acceptance is especially difficult. However, terror propagandists are aware of the challenges of this self-
radicalization process. Helfstein notes that much recruitment messaging focuses on moving prospective 
participants from interest to acceptance, because following acceptance, there is “a tendency to reduce 
cognitive dissonance” (p. 19) by proceeding directly to violent action. Once at acceptance, the recruit 
must act violently to embody his or her new perspective. 
 
Conditions of Inspire’s Reception 
 
 Just as the self-radicalization process differs among recruits, readers engage with Inspire 
uniquely, depending on preexisting individual beliefs. Readers also locate the magazine through many 
routes. Some may seek it after seeing Western media reports; some may learn of it from interpersonal 
contacts; others may find it on jihadi websites or discussion boards they already frequent. Regardless of 
the source, readers likely have questions about the magazine, either independently or prompted by online 
discussions. Although a full analysis of online discussions of Inspire is beyond the scope of this study, 
readers’ perusal of these discussions as part of their consumption of Inspire would undoubtedly affect their 
reception of the magazine’s messages.  
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For example, readers might ask whether Inspire was authentic—that is, a true representation of 
Al Qaeda. Torres Soriano (2012) notes that terrorist groups work hard to establish the credibility of their 
online messaging, especially because counterterrorism agents distribute messages falsely branded as 
terrorist media, sometimes for entrapment. The Al-Faloja online forum initially warned participants that 
Inspire was “the work of the apostate hypocrite dogs who are trying to discredit the Mujahideen,” as the 
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (2010) reported—but forum administrators soon reversed 
course and provided links to Inspire. Ample Western media coverage helped publicly authenticate Inspire 
soon after its release, as journalists reported government officials’ concerns about the publication.  
 
Readers might alter their interpretations of Inspire based upon the route to, and discussions of, 
the magazine that they encountered. Such disparities in readers’ conditions of reception mean that not all 
Inspire readers would follow the same course toward self-radicalization upon exposure to the magazine, or 
that self-radicalization would occur at all. This study suggests a few ways that the magazine may aid some 
readers through the progression of self-radicalization. 
 
Research Question 
 
 As noted earlier, Inspire has already been linked to terrorist attacks in the West, both attempted 
and successful. Though not the sole cause of these attacks, its content has appeared to assist, in some 
readers, the advancement of self-radicalization. Prior research on the magazine format suggests that the 
medium alone might help Al Qaeda unify an increasingly fragmented strategic communication effort and 
reinvigorate an otherwise vague organizational identity. However, there are additional insights to be 
gained from a close examination of Inspire’s content and style.  
 
Therefore, this study posed the following research question: In what ways may the content and 
style of Inspire reinforce the self-radicalization process described by Helfstein (2012)? The question 
encompasses the design of the magazine, the presentation of Al Qaeda ideology within the magazine’s 
content, and the narratives within its articles.  
 
Analyzing Inspire’s Content: Method 
 
Sample 
 
 For this analysis, I obtained digital PDF copies of all nine issues of Inspire available at the time of 
writing: Summer 2010, Fall 2010, a November 2010 “special issue,” Winter 2010, Spring 2011, Summer 
2011, a Fall 2011 “special issue,” Fall 2011, and Winter 2012. These nine issues constitute 525 pages of 
text and images. I downloaded these issues from the website Public Intelligence (2012). The same PDF 
files of Inspire can easily be located using search engines and are accessible on many websites. This 
ubiquity implies that both mainstream Internet users and jihadist website visitors can easily find Inspire.  
 
The magazine’s authenticity is a concern not only for its readers but also for researchers. Some 
critics (e.g., Fisher, 2010) initially raised questions about whether Inspire was an Al Qaeda publication. 
However, later public discussion among counterterrorism experts and officials appears to confirm its 
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legitimacy as an Al Qaeda publication. The consistency of these expert descriptions with the content of my 
copies suggests that editions used here match those possessed by counterterrorism experts. 
 
Analytic Approach and Limitations 
 
I conducted this analysis from an “involved outsider” perspective (Hermann, 2001). In the 
context of researching violent conflict, Hermann defines the involved outsider as  
 
one who is personally connected to the conflict by virtue of belonging to one of the 
national, religious or ethnic groups involved in it, or because of an identification with a 
general political stance . . . relevant to the analysis of the specific conflict. (2001, p. 79)  
 
As an American academic, I am not part of the target audience for Inspire, but I am part of a 
national group that its creators would like to attack through terrorist activities. My culture is also 
intertwined with that of prospective Inspire readers living in the West in that I share with them access to 
the same contemporary popular culture, the basis for much of the analysis below. However, I am not 
Muslim and do not read or speak Arabic, unlike Inspire’s desired audience, and likely possess a different 
socioeconomic status from many prospective readers; these differences may cause my interpretation of 
the magazine to vary from that of a truly insider reader within Inspire’s potential audience. Despite these 
differences, I have attempted to become “sensitized to multifarious historical, cultural and political 
specificities” through extensive relevant research (Mangen, 1999, p. 110) well beyond what is cited here.  
 
As a whole, my interpretation may not access some subtleties of Inspire that an insider reader 
from its prospective audience might offer. Gathering responses from this prospective audience to the 
magazine’s content would be another useful strategy for assessing the magazine’s potential for self-
radicalization, if perhaps ethically challenging. Yet cross-cultural qualitative research—particularly in an 
area as complex and important as terrorism—requires what Mangen (1999) calls “pragmatic 
accommodations” (p. 111). Inspire’s apparent ability to influence its target audience is already suggested 
by the range of news reports of its involvement in the planning of terror attacks, such as those noted in 
the introduction above and in recent scholarly summaries like that of Weimann (2012). The analysis that 
follows is an attempt to identify within the magazine’s design and content the elements that best seem to 
fit the current scholarly understanding of the self-radicalization process and that may have aided the 
magazine in possessing such influence. 
 
During my analysis, as I read the magazine, I noted physical characteristics, including its use of 
magazine design techniques, photography, and advertising-like images. I also read its text closely. My 
reading strategy can be described as a hermeneutic style of close reading, “locating the frame within the 
relevant context . . . traveling . . . repeatedly from the broader political culture to the specific ideational 
elements found in primary data and back again” (Gillan, 2008, p. 260). Gillan argues that this type of 
reading, which seeks a “deeper, more holistic meaning” (p. 260), looks for the roots of the frames that 
emerge from the text within the broader cultures in which they were constructed. This approach is an 
excellent fit for the cultural interpretation carried out here with regard to Al Qaeda’s strategic 
communication. 
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Results 
 
 A careful analysis of Inspire reveals that the magazine’s design, content, and narratives cohere in 
ways that could reinforce the stages of self-radicalization described by Helfstein (2012). Regardless of an 
Inspire reader’s degree of self-radicalization, the magazine format itself, as well as the content of the 
magazine, seems well designed to induce progress along the path from awareness to implementation. 
 
Awareness 
 
 Content enabling the stage of awareness in the self-radicalization process is easily recognized 
within Inspire. To reiterate, awareness in Helfstein’s model (2012) constitutes the development of a 
recruit’s knowledge of terrorist ideology and tactics. 
 
To generate awareness about Al Qaeda’s history, ideology, and preferred tactics, the magazine 
contains excerpts from leaders’ writings that have been previously distributed in other formats, though 
perhaps not in English until Inspire. For example, these include various writings by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, a 
senior Al Qaeda strategist and author of The Global Islamic Resistance Call, formerly widely distributed 
online. This inclusion bolsters the magazine’s message, given Suri’s position in Al Qaeda, and also calls for 
Western Muslims’ involvement in jihad. The three 2010 issues each include part of Suri’s Call, retitled “The 
Jihadi Experiences.” Suri’s “military theory” argues in the Fall 2010 issue for the effectiveness of 
“individual, secret jihad” in the larger geopolitical context. An excerpt in the Winter 2010 issue again 
advocates for individual jihad, promoting “‘light guerrilla warfare,’ ‘civilian terror’ and secret methods, 
especially . . . individual operations and small Resistance Units . . . separated from each other” (p. 32). 
Similarly, the Winter 2010 and Fall 2011 issues each feature cover stories by Anwar Al Awlaki that explain 
the “legality” of attacking civilians and taking money from “disbelievers” in countries “at war with the 
Muslims.” Quoting amply from the Quran and hadith, the articles present the jihadist scriptural 
interpretation used to justify their activities. The inclusion of this document, along with other historically 
grounded and complex analyses from Al Qaeda leaders, provides an understanding of Al Qaeda’s rationale 
for its ideology and actions, even if the recruit has not yet begun to alter his or her social norms, as 
required for Helfstein’s interest stage of self-radicalization.  
 
Beyond ideology, Inspire also details terror tactics used in past attacks that might be used in 
future attacks—ideally by the newly radicalized reader. Knowing that these methods are available and 
have succeeded further supports the awareness phase of self-radicalization. Prospective jihadis can begin 
to visualize how the magazine’s radical ideology can be enacted in the world. However, details of these 
methods are less important at the awareness stage than they are at the final implementation stage. I will 
discuss the details about violent acts that Inspire provides in the “Implementation” section below. 
 
Interest 
 
In Helfstein’s model, interest is the step of self-radicalization in which a recruit’s worldview 
changes to incorporate new ideology. Interest for the Inspire reader might be aided less by the manifest 
content of the magazine than by the design and format of the digital publication—specifically, its co-
optation of Western magazine characteristics and their typical impact.  
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For the sympathetic reader, the magazine format’s simple familiarity may normalize its 
challenging content through its representation as just another routine magazine topic in an everyday pop-
culture milieu. When a front-of-book magazine page offers up photos of international figures, annotated 
with (sometimes funny) quotes in a handwriting-style typeface, one expects to see Hollywood celebrities 
portraying what not to wear, not an array of international politicians, Al Qaeda leaders, and suicide 
bombers. Later, what looks like a routine travel story is really a tale of moving to Afghanistan to train with 
the mujahideen, complete with recommendations for shoes and reading material to pack (see Figure 3). 
What looks like a how-to story for a home improvement project, laid out in steps with photos, is really a 
set of instructions for building a bomb “in the kitchen of your mom.” What looks like an advertisement is 
really a joke satirizing a “traitorous” politician. The topic is still, always, jihad, but in Inspire, this 
otherwise disturbing content is shoehorned into a familiar visual and textual format that stylistically 
suggests a lighter tone and popular-culture content.  
 
 
Figure 3. A page from Inspire. 
 
 
Inspire’s use of the familiar Western magazine format may help initiate the reader’s acceptance 
of the jihadi identity. Just as Western magazines present identities that are aspirational and imply self-
actualizing possibilities for the reader who acts upon the publication’s recommendations, so too does 
Inspire. The expectations of the medium that a Western reader brings to Inspire could contribute to the 
normalization of the jihadi cause. Introducing jihad within an everyday, Western-style magazine context 
makes the idea seem plausible. This normalization might increase readers’ willingness to incorporate 
terrorist ideology into their own worldview. As McLuhan (1964) wrote, “it is only too typical that the 
‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium” (p. 9). Considering Inspire’s magazine 
12 Susan Currie Sivek International Journal of Communication 7(2013) 
nature in the Western media context, as well as its content, helps us see that its medium alone may 
amplify its success as a recruitment tool at the interest stage of self-radicalization. 
 
 Finally, more specific uses of Western pop-culture tropes in the magazine build its capacity for 
normalizing terrorist ideology and thereby encourage deeper interest. The magazine’s design and content 
connect explicitly to the Western popular culture in which recruits are likely immersed, especially younger 
Inspire readers. One of these pop-culture connections is the appearance of rap-like song lyrics in many 
issues. At first, the lines appear to be simply inspirational poetry. But a closer examination of the structure 
and style of the lines reveals their similarity to rap lyrics: 
 
 Al Qaeda is comin’ for you  
So you betta shape up as our war is anew 
 Smashin’ and bashin’, Cashin’ and Slashin’ 
 Is our fighting fashion 
 Pleasin’ the enemy is not a choice 
 ’Cuz it betrays Islam’s voice (Winter 2010 issue, p. 62) 
 
The lines of this text are organized into couplets, said to be the most frequently used rhyme 
scheme in “old-school” rap (see Figure 4). Many lines also demonstrate consonance between ideas as well 
as between sounds, a common feature of rap lyrics (Bradley, 2009, p. 50). These lines from the Summer 
2010 issue’s lyrics reflect this consonance: “Your rank in paradise will be one of progression / As the fire 
envelops your enemy in regression” (p. 63). With this hip-hop style, Inspire presents jihad in yet another 
normalizing, popular format that makes participation seem less foreign and more “cool.” For readers 
seeking social acceptance, this cool factor may enhance their desire and ability to modify personal beliefs 
and norms in the self-radicalization interest phase. 
 
 
        Figure 4. One of Inspire’s “raps.”  
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Another notable pop culture representation of jihad in Inspire is its appropriation of Western print 
advertising styles. One Fall 2010 ad mimics a movie poster, with individuals’ names staggered across the 
top. “An Al-Malahem Production” appears atop a neatly arrayed series of pictures of individual jihadis’ 
faces, like the ensemble cast of a new film. The title stretches below their pictures: “And Allah selects the 
martyrs,” followed by the tagline “they only came to journey to their Lord.” A Summer 2010 ad shows a 
large photo of an Adidas sneaker, but contrasts it—almost Adbusters-style—with a photo of feet wearing 
sandals made from plastic water bottles. “Ready to purchase your favorite shoes?” the headline reads. 
“First spend on those who deserve a share of your wealth . . . ” A Qur’an verse follows in Arabic and 
English to lend spiritual credence to the ad, followed by a notice that this is “a production of counter-
culture ads.” Another ad in the Winter 2012 issue says “Yes We Can”—the 2008 Barack Obama campaign 
slogan—over a photo of a man hiding a gun in his waistband as he ascends an escalator into an airport-
like public space. This ad is a “Fight in the West production. It seeks to inspire the believers to perform 
their duty of fighting for Islam’s cause.”  
 
Even the word choice in the ads—such as “diss” and “LOL”—reflects youthful pop-culture 
language. The use of the ad format in Inspire appropriates Western consumerist imagery and style while 
demonstrating another way otherwise routine components of the Western magazine format normalize the 
jihadi message. This normalization, combined with the impression of jihad’s coolness and popularity that 
Inspire conveys, could aid the reader in progressing through the interest stage of self-radicalization, 
because it makes altering personal beliefs and social norms seem reasonable and socially acceptable. 
 
Acceptance 
 
 Following awareness and interest, the third component of Helfstein’s model of self-radicalization 
is acceptance, in which recruits accept that only violence will bring about their adopted radical ideology 
and belief system. As noted, terror propagandists recognize the challenge of bringing about acceptance in 
recruits and strive to construct convincing arguments for violent “solutions.” Inspire’s creators deployed 
multiple methods of persuasion to induce this acceptance. Here I address two persuasive strategies to 
draw the reader into acceptance. First, Inspire repeatedly evokes guilt in the reader to call him or her to 
fulfill the jihadi’s violent duty, as defined in AQAP’s interpretation of Islam. Second, a much more subtle 
narrative is woven throughout Inspire that bears remarkable similarities to contemporary superhero 
narratives familiar to Western audiences. 
 
The jihadi’s religious duty. The primary identity promoted to Inspire’s readers is the model of 
the individual jihadi undertaking violence (primarily against Westerners) on behalf of Islam and its people, 
toward the goal of the establishment of a global Islamic nation. Although Inspire readers may already be 
intellectually familiar with Al Qaeda’s arguments for individual jihad (awareness) and have adopted this 
perspective (interest), they may not yet emotionally accept that violence must be done to fulfill the 
mission set forth. Therefore, Inspire must also bring significant emotional weight to bear upon potential 
jihadis, and it does so through guilt and fear. 
 
An interview in the Summer 2010 issue with Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a senior leader of AQAP, includes 
this advice:  
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My advice to my Muslim brothers in the West is to acquire weapons and learn methods 
of war. They are living in a place where they can cause great harm . . . It is not enough 
. . . to participate in demonstrations and protests . . . The successful means are through 
explosive devices and sacrificing souls . . . The means of harming them are many so 
seek assistance from Allah and do not be weak and you will find a way. (p. 17) 
 
While the first portion of al-Wuhayshi’s command is tactical, his implication that the reader who does not 
pursue violence is “weak” could be perceived as insulting; readers may feel they must rise to the occasion. 
Furthermore, if readers don’t participate, they betray other believers and God. Similarly, a Fall 2010 
article, titled “O Hesitant One: It’s an Obligation!” says, “Until when must the love of jihad remain just 
another one of those hobbies of yours with which you while away your free time[?]” (p. 65), seeming to 
speak directly to Pantucci’s Loners who peruse jihadist material online.  
 
 The magazine idolizes those who were strong and set aside frivolity to pursue jihad. People who 
attempted or completed individual acts of violence are described as models for readers, with their anti-
Western sentiments quoted in the Winter 2010 issue. These role models include unsuccessful “underwear 
bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad; Roshonara Choudhury 
of England, who stabbed a British MP (he survived); and Stockholm suicide bomber Taimour Abdulwahhab 
al-Abdaly, who killed himself and injured two others. A full page in the Winter 2010 issue is dedicated to 
Choudhury and Abdaly, highlighted as “followers of the borderless loyalty.” In another section, Abdaly’s 
picture receives the commendatory caption “We need more like him.” The Fall 2011 issue contains a long 
article with multiple photos of dead AQAP members and testimonials to their martyrdom, demonstrating 
that they are remembered and valued even after death. These jihadis’ bravery and fidelity are celebrated 
in Inspire. 
 
Throughout the magazines, ample quotations from the Qur’an and scholarly commentaries 
accompany every call to violence, each calculated to legitimate violence through Al Qaeda’s interpretation. 
For example, the Fall 2010 issue contains an eight-page explanation attributed to Awlaki; he disagrees 
with the New Mardin Declaration issued in March 2010 by a group of Muslim scholars and theologians. The 
Declaration asserts a peaceful Islamic perspective and denounces the justification of violence with Islamic 
legal edicts. The Declaration states, “Anyone who seeks support from [these legal statements] for killing 
Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation and has misapplied the revealed texts” (Mardin 
Conference, 2010, pp. 2–3). Awlaki argues against the Mardin Conference’s perspective. The magazine’s 
constant efforts to demonstrate the permissibility of jihad, particularly individual jihad, reflect what 
Corman and Schiefelbein (2008) observed in a range of Al Qaeda’s communication efforts: the desire to 
legitimate the movement to the public at large and to other Muslims. The magazine represents yet 
another way that movement leaders attempt to make jihad not only justified but also obligatory for “true” 
Muslims. 
 
 The superhero narrative. Certainly more than one narrative is present in the magazine, but 
the narrative of the superhero is repeated and reinforced through various stylistic and content elements. 
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In testimony to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee regarding AQAP and Inspire, Al Qaeda 
expert Jarret Brachman stated that the magazine offers:  
 
an arena for escapist fantasy and role-playing by empowering their audience with new 
knowledge, skill-sets, role models and incentives for actualizing that knowledge. AQAP’s 
role models, like any comic superhero, are portrayed as average men who discover that 
they have superhuman abilities. These “ordinary guys turned superheroes” who 
comprise AQAP’s dominant media personalities must then wield their superpowers to 
triumph over evil (the Crusaders) and save damsels in distress (Islam). (Terrorist 
Threat, 2011) 
 
Though Brachman provided this description of Inspire in his testimony and mentions it briefly on his blog, 
locating this narrative within the magazine requires further analysis. This particular narrative connects to 
the real-life social conditions faced by the target audience for Inspire, perhaps intensifying its resonance. 
Inspire’s construction of the superhero narrative has four notable characteristics, each of which is 
represented in previous superhero tales in a variety of media. These are the marginality of the superhero; 
the secret identity of the superhero; the simplistic construction of the villain fought by the superhero; and 
the emphasis on the masculinity of superheroes, especially in contrast to the weakness of the women they 
defend. 
 
 Inspire is targeted primarily to Muslim readers in the West, many of whom struggle in difficult 
economic circumstances and intolerant social environments, and likely feel they live on the fringes of 
society. Inspire emphasizes intolerance, oppression, and violence against Muslims worldwide by Western 
governments, speaking to  
 
Muslim brothers residing in the states of the Zio-Crusader coalition, whether they are 
from the emigrant communities, like those which live on the margins of society in the 
miserable suburbs of Paris, London and Detroit, or are from those arriving in America 
and Europe [to study or work]. (Winter 2010 issue, p. 17)  
 
These are precisely the groups that are the subject of concern regarding Al Qaeda recruitment (Sageman, 
2008). Inspire suggests that these individuals can become heroic if they participate in individual jihad. The 
words hero, heroism, and champion are used often: “Anyone who says [violence is not necessary] . . . is 
not prepared to make sacrifices that heroes and champions make” (Fall 2010 issue, p. 47). A direct line to 
God and a “true” understanding of God’s plans could even replace superpowers. Marginal figures are 
elevated to heroes with a sacred mission, and Inspire tells them God endorses their actions. 
 Inspire also glamorizes readers’ “secret identity” as covert jihadis, making it sound intriguing, 
intellectually challenging, and mysterious. The Winter 2012 issue describes “Qualities of an Urban 
Assassin” who is “qualif[ied] as a tool for the religion’s victory.” These qualities include the “ability to 
intermingle well into modern society and its culture . . . He seems to be an ordinary citizen in everyday 
clothing . . . Instead of appearing ultra-conservative in religion, he can make himself appear as matured 
through life experiences” (pp. 37–38). This is followed by advice regarding beard maintenance. The 
Summer 2010 issue contains four pages of instructions for using encryption software for “sending 
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important messages without it being noticed by the enemy” (p. 41), and also suggests writing physical 
letters in “special symbols” and “leaving them in ‘uninhabited areas’” (p. 44), evoking spy novel plots. 
And, lest the reader still hesitate: “We shall send you coded messages whose meaning only you will 
understand, in newscasts, newspapers, and websites. Every report which talks about us you will read as if 
it is talking about you” (Fall 2010 issue, p. 66). The ability to perceive this message seems a special gift in 
itself, even if a reader is tentative about participating in jihad. This complex double life perhaps beguiles 
the reader who may otherwise live on the edge of society and feel unimportant. This emotional appeal 
increases Inspire’s capability to engender the acceptance stage of the self-radicalization process. 
 
A third characteristic of this superhero narrative that pertains to the acceptance stage is the 
simplistic construction of the jihadi superheroes’ enemy. Superheroes’ enemies are usually mere 
caricatures with little backstory or rational basis for their evil. The villain in Inspire’s story is “the West” or 
“the Crusaders.” Inspire discusses the enemy little beyond describing injustices and violence done to 
Muslims, resulting in a thin portrait of those whom Al Qaeda fights. Supporters of the West are called 
“servants of the Zionist-Crusader project” (Fall 2010 issue, p. 44). As Weimann (2008) describes, those 
trying to convince others to engage in behavior that contravenes their moral standards use a variety of 
rhetorical tactics, including dehumanization: “stripping the victim of human attributes . . . [resulting] in 
the victim’s being viewed as subhuman and not as a person with feelings and qualities” (p. 79). The 
reduction of all Western civilization to two simplistic monikers distracts recruits from the value of 
individuals within Western societies. The fact that they are not Muslims justifies their murder: “it is 
legitimate to target the people of the West and we have no doubts about its legitimacy” (January 2011 
issue, p. 21). 
 
Finally, true jihadi heroes are defenders of women, yet another way in which guilt and emotion 
can bring Inspire readers to the stage of acceptance. Inspire frequently mentions the “injustices” done to 
“chaste” Muslim women and their “honor,” particularly as manifested by the French ban of the niqab 
garment worn by some Muslim women (addressed at length in the Summer 2010 issue). The magazine 
often notes women’s deaths in fights with Western troops. Jihadi “brothers” are called upon to defend 
women, just as male superheroes defend damsels in distress. Uniting with one’s brothers as jihadi 
superheroes—martyrs for faith, women, and other Muslims—must seem a compelling and somewhat 
familiar narrative for some audience members. The magazine format and its pop-culture styling make this 
narrative feel even more normal and plausible. 
 
Although the concept of the violent jihadi as a hero might seem contradictory to outsiders, 
today’s Western pop culture provides multiple models of flawed heroes who live on the fringes of society, 
who fight for righteousness even though they themselves are not perfect, and who commit violence to 
bring about justice. The New York Times recently noted the rise of the “self-made superhero,” as in the 
recent films Kick-Ass and Super (Lidz, 2011). These films’ main characters lack actual superpowers, but 
set themselves personal missions of heroism, just like a Loner jihadi. In many ways, the plausibility of the 
jihadi as a hero may seem greater to Inspire readers who reside in Western cultures, where the superhero 
narrative is popular and superheroes are often shown as flawed, morally uncertain, and self-fashioned 
heroic figures whose social position is personally resonant for the inspired jihadi. The subtle resonance of 
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this narrative of (super)heroism may enhance the magazine’s ability to move prospective jihadis into the 
acceptance stage of the self-radicalization process. 
 
Implementation 
 
Once in the acceptance phase, the prospective jihadi simply needs to carry out an actual act of 
violence to achieve what Helfstein (2012) calls implementation. As Helfstein notes, once acceptance is 
complete and the jihadi believes violence must be done, he or she must follow through with it to truly 
embody the newly accepted precepts.  
 
 
Figure 5. An instructional piece in Inspire. 
 
 
Inspire presents a wealth of ideas for violence, as mentioned above, primarily in the “Open 
Source Jihad” series of articles. (See Figure 5.) The dictionary-style definition of “open source jihad” 
provided in each of these sections states that it is a  
 
resource manual for those who loathe the tyrants . . . informal: a disaster for the 
repressive imperialistic nations: The open source jihad is America’s worst nightmare. It 
allows Muslims to train at home instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad. Look no 
further, the open source jihad is now at hands reach [sic]. (italics in original) 
 
The Fall 2010 issue explains how to weld blades onto a pickup truck and drive it into sidewalk 
cafes and similar public places to cause injury and death. (Bin Laden denigrated this technique, saying it 
was too indiscriminately violent even for Al Qaeda [Rotella, 2011].) Several articles describe how to use 
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various guns and include photos of different shooting stances. The Summer 2011 issue explains how to 
make acetone peroxide for bombs with readily available ingredients—bombs that might be detonated with 
the remote control devices described in the Fall 2011 issue. The Winter 2012 issue includes a seven-page 
article with instructions and photos showing how to use a firebomb to start a forest fire. The article 
recommends “the valleys of Montana” as an ideal location for this attack. In short, each issue of Inspire 
makes the implementation stage of self-radicalization an easy task. The jihadi need only follow the 
provided instructions and diagrams.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The content and style of Inspire are well calibrated to ease the potential recruit’s passage 
through the stages of self-radicalization. As Helfstein states, this process is not necessarily linear, and, as 
such, the magazine contains a variety of material that could intrigue individuals at any stage in the 
process. This material remains subject to the individual’s interpretation, yet the magazine’s creative 
appropriation of Western popular-culture design motifs and narratives seems likely to resonate effectively 
with its target audience of marginalized Muslims in the West who seek self-actualization in the digital 
pages of Inspire. 
 
This study is unable to examine whether the target audience for Inspire is in fact affected by its 
content in these ways. Given the marginal nature of that target audience, the magazine’s subject matter, 
and the criminality of terrorism, it would be challenging to research the effects of this publication on 
readers’ attitudes and participation in jihad. It would be intriguing (if disturbing) to trace whether Inspire 
continues to be mentioned in future accounts of attempted or completed attacks in the West, or if its 
suggested methods are employed. It would also be interesting to compare and contrast Inspire’s 
narratives with those presented in Al Qaeda messages in other formats. 
 
Given the comprehensive nature of Inspire’s content with regard to the self-radicalization 
process, a review of proposed countermeasures for combating terrorism in the West reveals a logical fit: 
the dissemination of counternarratives and alternative interpretations that can compete with Inspire’s 
version of reality for this target audience. Sageman (2008) argues that such a narrative counterattack 
should be conducted by Muslims themselves for credibility’s sake, and that “non-Muslims have no role to 
play in this debate . . . The Internet should become the battleground of this war of interpretations, hopes, 
dreams, and aspirations” (p. 160). Sageman suggests that organizers should identify opinion leaders in 
online forums where Muslim youth seek information and guidance, and subtly “influence them to embrace 
nonviolence as a way to fulfill Muslim aspirations” (2008, p. 160). Amble (2012) suggests that 
governments should better utilize social media and other digital platforms to promote positive attitudes 
toward the West and circulate counternarratives. Along these lines, a recent effort by the U.S. State 
Department replaced Al Qaeda–sponsored anti-American ads on Yemeni tribal forums with ads that 
showed images of Yemeni casualties caused by Al Qaeda attacks (Clayton, 2012). 
 
Another effort to present alternative, peaceful narratives of Islam is demonstrated by a comic 
book and animated TV series called The 99, named for the 99 attributes of Allah. Young people around the 
world receive superpowers from magical stones, then live by whichever of the 99 qualities they represent. 
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This series uses a new narrative of heroism to combat terrorist groups’ suggestions. The young 
superheroes model international cooperation and tolerance. One of the show’s creators said, “I’m one of 
those people who believes that the only way to beat extremism is through arts and culture. That’s what 
happened in Europe during the Reformation and the Renaissance, and that’s what has to happen in the 
Muslim world” (quoted in Truitt, 2011). Terrorists’ ability to craft and efficiently distribute powerful 
narratives that appear to justify their acts must be met with counternarratives that offer an alternative 
repository of culturally and personally resonant ideas for potential recruits. 
 
 Fully understanding the power of various popular media formats and the cultural resonance of the 
narratives terrorists present within them is an initial step in developing campaigns to counter them. 
Perhaps media scholars can play a greater role in helping to analyze the significance and resonance of the 
various media technologies and messages employed by those attempting to mobilize others to 
participation in terror-related causes. Even if these researchers themselves are not part of the community 
that can credibly intervene in the actual discussions of these issues, insights from the study of terrorist 
media may be vital in supporting the fight against a new brand of terrorism that uses media and 
storytelling as powerful weapons. 
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